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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
LOENE NELSON,
Plaintiff, Appellant and
Respondent on Cross Appeal,

Case No.
-vs.-

9929

EARL LEROY HUTCHINGS
Defendant, Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries sustained by her when she was walking south on Second East
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah in a crosswalk with the red
light in her favor and was struck by the defendant's car
which was making a left turn to the west on Sixth South
Street.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case 'ras tried to a jury which granted judgment
to the plaintiff for $3,550.00. The court granted defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment granted by the
court and reinstatement of the jury verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff brought action against defendant to recover
damages for injuries sustained in an auto-pedestrian aecident that occurred at the intersection of Second East and
Sixth South streets in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 28, 1962
at approximately 7:20 P.M. Sixth South Street is a fourlane blacktop level highway running east and west and Second East is a four-lane street running north and south, and
is also level. Both streets are approximately 90 feet wide
( R.85) . There were painted crosswalks on all sides of the
intersection. The east line of the crosswalk on the west side
of the intersection was 14 feet 3 inches from the west side
of Second East Street ( R87). The crosswalk itself was seven
feet five inches wide. The crosswalk south of the intersection
is approximately the same distance from the south side of
the intersection as the west crosswalk is from the west side
of the intersection. Traffic at the intersection was controlled
by a single semaphore signal located in the center of the
intersection (RlOl) diplaying the usual red, green and yellow signals, in that order.
The plaintiff approached the intersection from the north
and was walking south along the west side of Second East
Street. When she arrived at the intersection the light was
red for east-west traffic and not knowing how long it had
been red she waited for it to turn green and then red again
(R102, 129). When the light turned red the second time
she looked to the east, to the north and to the west and
saw no cars approaching (Rl02). She looked to the south
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and ~aw a car facing north and observed it proceeding forward in a northerly direction, but no signal for
a left turn was being given by the driver (R102, 165) and
~he assumed it would continue directly north (R102). She
traveled at her normal walking gait within the crosswalk
approximately 39 feet six inches from the north side of the
street when she was struck by the defendant's vehicle ( R87,
Exh. 1 P). The impact occurred about 17 feet eleven inches
west of the west side of Second East. As she walked across
the street Mrs. Nelson looked mostly ahead but also looked
to the west and glanced to the east ( R130, 133) but didn't
notice defendant's car again until just before the impact. She
glanced down at her purse which she was carrying in her
right hand, and which struck her leg just before the accident
occurred (R102). As she glanced at the purse she heard
the noise of a car and glanced to the east as the car struck
her. She saw the car but it was too late to do anything (R103).
She was struck by the right front of the defendant's car
and knocked or carried and thrown approximately 22 feet
from the point of impact ( R88).
The road surface was dry, it was a clear day and visibilty was good except for the fact that the sun was low in the
"·estern sky and created a glary condition ( R89).
The defendant stopped at the south side of the intersection. The light was red. When the light turned green he
proceeded forward at a speed of five to ten miles per hour
( R173). He traveled north until he was about to the center
of the intersection, or to the semaphore signal, when he
started to turn left ( Rl7 4). As he turned to the left the sun
struck him in the eyes ( R17 4). The defendant knew that
the sun would be low in the sky (R175). Although the sun
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struck the defendant in the eyes he continued forward without application of brakes until his wife said, "Stop" just
before the impact with Mrs. Nelson. The defendant did not
see Mrs. Nelson at any time before the impact occurred
(R175).
ARGUMENT
PO,INT I
THE CO,URT CO,MMITTED ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AS A MATTER o~F LAW AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VERDICT.

In determining on appeal whether questions of negligence and contributory negligence were properly submitted
to the jury, the reviewing court must review the evidence,
together with every inference fairly arising therefrom, in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Coombs vs.
Perry, 2 Utah(2) 381, 275 P(2) 680. The plaintiff was
the prevailing party under the jury verdict.
The court granted a judgment notwithstanding verdict
( R68) to the defendant in this case on the basis of the decision handed down in Mingus vs. Olsson, 201 P(2) 495, Utah,
1949, 144 Ut. 505. The court in that case held the deceased
Mingus was guilty of negligence as a matter of law in failing to look for traffic before crossing 13th East Street in
an unmarked crosswalk, at its intersection with Westminster
Avenue.
The testimony with respect to deceased's conduct as
given by his wife was as follows:
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··As they stepped off the curb and started easterly
aero~~ 13th East Street, decedent was to her left or
north~ that he looked neither to the left nor right,
but looked straight ahead as they proceeded across
the street~ that he ~aid nothing to her about approaching traffic.''
The facts in our case are substantially different from
tho~e in the !1/ingus vs. Olsson case. In our case the plaintiff
testified that she did look prior to crossing the street. She
looked in all directions. The light was red in her favor.
She saw the vehicle of the defendant at the south side of the
intersection. No signal was being given for a left turn. She
then continued into the crosswalk watching ahead of her
and also looking to the west and glancing to the east. She
looked down at her purse just prior to the impact when the
purse struck her leg as she thought that the purse might have
con1e open.
An independent witness testified he saw her look in
each direction before starting across the intersection. (R83)
This set of facts is different from that set forth in Mingus vs.
Olsson and the rule as stated in Mingus vs. Olsson is not
controlling in this case. There is no dispute about her having
looked adequately before starting across the intersection. A
different rule of law was applicable to the respective parties
'rith respect to right-of-way. In the Mingus vs. Olsson case
the deceased left a place of safety and stepped into a position of peril when the right-of-way was very doubtful. In
our case the right-of-way of Mrs. Nelson is very clear as
she had a red light in her favor.
In the case of Coombs vs. Perry, supra, the plaintiff
and her friend were walking south on the east side of Washington Boulevard in Ogden between 26th and 27th Streets
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in the evening about twilight. As they reached the mid-block
crosswalk, plaintiff looked to the north and saw a bus 1~
blocks away. They decided to cross the street to see if it was
her bus. Plaintiff walked west to the middle of the street
and looked north. Seeing no vehicles between herself and
the comer, she took a few steps westerly when she suddenly
became a ware of headlights to the north and was immediately struck by defendant's automobile. She saw defendant
standing over her and said,
"Where on earth did you come from? I didn't see you."
The plaintiff's friend watched plaintiff stop and look to
the north. She said she also looked and didn't see any cars
coming. The court said:
"It is to be borne in mind that although the motorist and pedestrian are both required to exercise the
same degree of care, that of the ordinary prudent
person under the circumtances, that standard imposes
upon the motorist a greater amount of caution than
upon the pedestrian because of the potential danger
to others in the operation of an automobile. Inasmuch as it is incontrovertible that plaintiff was struck
in a marked crosswalk and defendant himself says
he didn't see her at all it seems unquestionable that
a jury question existed as to whether he kept a proper
lookout for pedestrians at the crosswalk, or, even
if it were to be assumed that he did so, whether he
observed due care in affording plaintiff the rightof-way to which she was entitled."
The Court said:
"The problem of importance was whether plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
I aw. "
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'-Was the evidence so clear and compelling that all
reasonable minds must say that it was established by
a preponderance of the evidence that she was negligent and that such was a proximate cause of her injury?"
The Court said:
''In contending that this question must be answered
affirmatively defendant relies upon the proposition
that the plaintiff must be deemed to have seen what
was there to be seen." Citing a number of cases
handed down by Utah and other courts in support
thereof.
The Court further said:
"Analysis of such authorities will reveal significant
factual differences from the case at bar. Usually the
pedestrian had just stepped from the curb into a traffic lane or out from behind a vehicle or other object
obstructing the view into the path of an oncoming ve-

.I ,
hICe.

Typical of such cases is Mingus vs. Olsson. The court then
reasoned that the defendant's vehicle may not have been on
\\~ashington Boulevard at the time the plaintiff and her companion looked. However, the court further stated that the
affirmance of the judgment need not, however, rest upon
the hypothesis that defendant was not on Washington Boulevard at the time plaintiff stopped and looked. Assuming that
defendant 'ras there and hence that plaintiff either saw or
should haYe seen him, the trial court properly submitted
the questions of her negligence and whether it proximately
caused her injury to the jury.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

"The salient point is that plaintiff as a pedestrian
in a marked crosswalk had the right-of-way. The
right-of-way simply means this: That if two persons
are so proceeding that if they continued their course
there would be a danger of collision, the disfavored
one, defendant, must give away, and the favored one,
plaintiff, may proceed; and the favored one may
assume that this will be done. It is, of course, recognized that the right-of-way rule would not apply if
when the favored one approached the crossing point
the disfavored one was so close that in due care he
could not or should not reasonably be expected to
. way. ''
give
Further quoting:
"And the jury could reasonably find that in due
care she might rely upon the assumption that he
would so (slow down, turn to his right, or stop, if
necessary, to afford the plaintiff the right-of-way
and avoid striking her) until something occurred
to warn her to the contrary. The evidence fails to
disclose that any horn was sounded or that there
was any other indication manifest which could have
been observed by her to indicate that he was not
going to afford her the right-of-way until it was too
late to do anything to save herself from peril.
Consideration must be given not only to the fact that
she had the right-of-way upon which she could place
some reliance, but also that a pedestrian crossing a
busy street must be constantly vigilant for her safety
with respect to all of the conditions around her. Even
if a car is s~een approaching, unless it is so positioned
as to constitute an immediate hazard to her, she is
not necessarily obliged to focus full and undivided
attention on that particular car and so cakulate
her entire conduct as to avoid beng struck by it. She
need not anticipate that the driver will speed, fail

***
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to obser-ve . or control his car, or fail to afford her
thfl! right-of-way or otherwise be negligent unless in
dut· care she observes or should observe something
to warn her of such improper conduct." (Bracketed
n1aterial our~.) (Italics ours.)
Quoting again:
"In accord with such thought is the case of Olsen vs.
Peerless Laundry, Ill Wash. 660, 191 P 756, wherein the court reiterated the rule that a pedestrian has
the duty to look for approaching vehicles but said
that after doing so whether ordinary care requires
him to continue to look in the same direction or to
look again, depends on other attendant circumstances,
holding that the question of his contributory negligence was one of fact for the jury. Similarly, in
Jensen vs. Culbert, where a woman was struck down
at an intersection, the court said that there being
nothing to show to the contrary, it must be assumed
that she saw the car, but inasmuch as the law gave
her the right-of-way and the car must have been more
than 100 feet away when she started to cross, it could
reasonably be found within her duty of due care
to assume that the car would afford her the rightof-way, and concluded that it could not be said as
a matter of law that she was guilty of contributory
negligence. Another case on this pont is Bo?ster vs.
Cooper, 188 Minn. 364, 247 NW 250. Plaintiff first
saw defendant's car some two blocks away, saw it
again when it was 200 feet away, but not again till
it was right upon him. It was urged that his failure
to continue to watch and avoid being struck by the
car made him guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. But the court said that where he had
the right-of-way for the reason as stated in the Jensen case just referred to the question of his contributory negligence was for the jury."
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In the case of Lowder vs. Holly, Utah, 233 P(2) 350,
in which the plaintiff Lowder failed to see the defendant's
truck approaching the intersection, the court reasoned that
when the plaintiff stopped at the intersecion the approaching truck was far enough away to have afforded plaintiff
an opportunity to safely cross and that the plaintiff could
have assumed and acted on the assumption that the driver
of the defendant's truck would exercise ordinary reasonable
care in his driving and it would be safe to cross the intersection.
"Under such a state of facts Lowder's failure to see
the truck could in no way have contributed to the
accident."
Quoting further,
"In other words, even if he had seen the approaching
truck, it could have been found, consistent with due
care for plaintiff to assume that he would be afforded
his right-of-way because of entering the intersection
first and proceed across. So the accident might well
have happened just as it did, whether Lowder saw
the defendant or not."
On the same point is the ruling in Hess vs. Robinson, 109
Utah 60, 163 P(2) 510, where the plaintiff failed to see an
ambulance coming into the intersection from the west. The
court said:
"It was a jury question as to whether even if plaintiff had seen the ambulance the jury could have found
it to be within his duty of care to think that the
ambulance would obey the stop sign and that he was
entitled to proceed until it became apparent to him
that the ambulance was not going to do so, so that
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it wa~ a question of fact whether even if he had seen
it he would have realized it was not going to obey
the stop sign in time to have avoided the accident.
Consequently, the question of proximate cause; that
i ~. whether the accident would have happened irrespective of his negligence in failing to see the ambulance was properly submitted to the jury. See Poulson
vs. lllanness, Utah 241 P(2) 152."
Certainly the facts in the Nelson case before this court
are ~tronger in favor of the plaintiff Nelson than were the
facts in the case of Coombs vs. Perry. The Hutchings vehicle
was traveling at such a slow speed that Mrs. Nelson would
have at any time up to the time of impact, if she had looked
at the approaching vehicle, anticipated that the driver was
watching her and that he would stop before running into
her, and afford her her right-of-way.
In the case of Edith M. Langlois vs. Nor man T. Reese,
(the Honorable Merrill C. Faux, sitting with a jury), wherein the plaintiff was crossing State Street at a "T" intersection where there was no crosswalk this court, although holding the plaintiff guilty of negligence in crossing the street
at other than at a marked crosswalk, nevertheless submitted
the case to the jury on the question of proximate cause. In
that case the plaintiff before crossing the street looked both
ways on Sate Street and also looked up First Avenue before
she started to cross, but she stated that the way was clear
and she didn "t see the vehicle. There was no question but
what the case '""as properly submitted to the jury for its
determination as to the question of proximate cause on the
negligence of the plaintiff. 351 P(2) 638, 10 Ut. (2) 272.
In the case of Fox vs. Taylor, 10 Utah (2) 174, 350
P (2) 154, Miss Fox was crossing 5th South Street at a
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point between 1Oth and 11th East. She was crossing from
south to north and as she approached the street she looked
to the west and saw no automobiles coming eastward on 5th
South, but did see the defendant stopped at the 1Oth East
intersection, about % of a block away. Without making further observation, she proceeded to cross the street. Meanwhile, the defendant was coming easterly in the inside lane
toward her at a speed of between 25 and 30 miles per hour,
and when the plaintiff had nearly reached the center island
which is in that street the defendant's car struck her throwing
her to the ground and causing her injury. She was crossing
at a point other than in a crosswalk, and in that case the
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was held to
have been properly submitted to the jury.
In the case of Charvoz vs. Cottrell, 12 Utah( 2) 25, 361
P(2) 516, the decedent was crossing 17th South Street on
the west side of the intersection of 17th South and 19th East
Street during the nighttime. The decedent was walking within a marked crosswalk. The defendant Cottrell was driving
east on 17th South Street and struck the decedent as the decedent entered into the eastbound lane of traffic. The decedent made a statement to his mother at the hospital that he
did not see the defendant's automobile approaching. The
court in that -case held that the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence and the defendant's negligence was properly submitted to the jury.
In the case of Clarke vs. Tatum, U. S. Court of Appeals, Virginia, 21 Automobile Cases (2) 657, plaintiff
brought an action to recover for personal injuries sustained
when he was struck by defendant's automobile while crossing in a crosswalk with the traffic light in his favor. The
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clt·ft·ndant had stopped for the red light facing him and
activated his left turn signal. When the light turned green
for him and was red for the pedestrian, he started his left
turn. The pedestrian never did see him. The pedestrian
was struck on the left ~ide when near the center of the
~~ reet, but still in the crosswalk, by the right front fender
of defendant's automobile. Plaintiff had no idea where
defendant\, car came from except that it came from his
left. Defendant did not see plaintiff. Defendant conceded
his negligence. The court said:
··\\re cannot say that plaintiff who was crossing the
~lreet at a proper place, and who had the right-of-way
over defendant's vehicle, was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law in failing to keep a
constant lookout for approaching vehicles from his
left. Such a question is almost always one for the
trier of the facts, and this is not one of the exceptional cases where recovery should be denied as a
matter of law."

The court further quotes:
·"Certainly under the factual situation here involved,
reasonable minds might well differ as to whether
the plaintiff exercised care for his own safety, or
'ras guilty of contributory negligence which would
bar his recovery."
Section 6628 of Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
and Practice, \'olume lOB, at page 149, reads as follo,vs:
"It is an exceptional case in which
of recovery should be denied as
when he has been injured while
public thoroughfare, and it is the

a plaintiff's right
a matter of law,
walking upon a
general rule that
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the issue of whether pedestrians or others on foot
have been contributorily negligent is one for the
.
"
JUry.
In the case of Chevalley vs. Degar, Ohio, 52 NE (2)
544, which involved an accident at an intersection where
there was a traffic light, the court stated:
"A pedestrian, before stepping on a street at an intersection, must look in both directions for vehicular
traffic, and whether a pedestrian should look again,
in the exercise of ordinary care, is a question for the
jury under proper instructions."
Our own approved jury instructions, set out in J.I.F.U.
20.3, 20.8 only places the obligation of reasonable care
under the circumstances and is in accord with the general
rule.
In the case of Lout is vs. Bishop, Oregon 1960, 21 Automobile Cases, ( 2) 355, plaintiff was crossing in a marked
crosswalk. Before starting to cross she looked to the left
and to the right. She saw the headlights of a car at least
two blocks away; she thought that she had plenty of time.
She was struck as she approached the opposite side of the
street. The court said:
"It is a question for the jury whether she was negligent and negligence was the proximate cause in her
not looking again."
In the case of Galatzer vs. Schwartz, Illinois, 1960, 20
Automobile Cases (2) 891, plaintiff, a pedestrian, was in·
jured when she was struck by a left turning car at a crosswalk
on a bright afternoon. The trial court submitted the issues
of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's contributory
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negligence for not seeing the defendant's vehicle ahead of
her which went out about to the center of the intersection
and then turned left and into the plaintiff. Jury returned
a ver·dict of $11,000 for plaintiff who appealed on the
i~~ue that the damages were inadequate and that the court
~t.ould have directed a verdict for the plaintiff and not
~ubmitted the question of contributory negligence. The
Supreme Court held the trial court should have directed
the verdict and submitted only the issue of damages.

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 THAT PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATIER OF LAW AND THAT THE
ONLY ISSUE FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE WAS WHETHER
PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE 0'F
HER INJUR·Y.
Defendant has filed a cross appeal claiming error in
the court's failing to give defendant's requested instruction
~0. -l.
The court did not err in not giving the defendant's
requested instruction. Whether or not defendant was guilty
of negligence was a jury question as also was the question
of whether the negligence, if any, was a proximate cause of
the accident. Plaintiff's argument contained in its main
brief in support of plaintiff's appeal fully covers the plaintiff' 5 position. The cases and authorities cited by plaintiff
unanimously support the holding that the matter was properly submitted to the jury at the trial.
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The jury had to consider the question of proximate
cause before it could find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The jury has found, therefore, that the plaintiff's conduct
was not a proximate cause of her own injuries. The defendant was not entitled to such an instruction but if it
was entitled to it, the court's failure to give it was harmless error because the jury did find under proper instructions that plaintiff's conduct was not a proximate cause of
the accident.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the facts the plaintiff was not guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The cases
are unanimous in holding that a jury question exists where
the plaintiff, pedestrian, has a red light in her favor and
the trial court erred in granting defendant a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict. The jury verdict should be
reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,

LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant and
Cross Respondent
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